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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Petitioner/Appellant has appealed to this Court from a final order entered by
the Utah Labor Commission Appeals Board ("Board"). This Court has jurisdiction to
hear and decide this appeal pursuant to §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a), 34A-l-303(6), and 63-46b-16,
Utah Code Annot.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Board acted within its statutory discretion in substituting its findings

and conclusions for those of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Utah appellate courts have applied an
intermediate level of scrutiny to agency determinations when the Legislature has given
the agency a grant of discretion in the governing statute. See Morton International Inc.
v. Auditing Division. 814 P.2d 581, 587-88 (Utah 1991); Osman Home Improvement v.
Industrial Commission, 958 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In Utah Code Ann. §
34A-1-301, the Legislature granted the Labor Commission the "duty and full power,
jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in [the applicable]
chapter or any other title or chapter it administers." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301.
Furthermore, the Legislature granted the Board the authority to "reverse the findings,
conclusions, and decision of an administrative law judge." Utah Code Ann, § 34A-1303(4)(a)(iv). Given that the Legislature granted the Board the authority to accept,
modify, or reverse the ALJ's findings and adopt its own, an appellate court will not
disturb the agency's determinations unless it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and

rationality.

See Capo roz v. Labor Commission, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App.

1997)("[a]gency discretion may be either express or implied and, if granted, results in
review of the agency action for an abuse of discretion"); Niederhauser Ornamental &
Metal Works Co. v. Tax Commission, 858 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The issue was preserved in the record at R. 950-957.
2.

Whether substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that there was no

causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action.
Standard of Review: The determination of whether a causal connection exists
between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse action is an issue of fact. See
Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993, 995 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). This Court
"grants great deference to an agency's findings, and will uphold them if they are
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court.'" Department of the Air Force v. Swiden 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g).

"Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Moreover, this
Court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views even
if it may come to a different conclusion had the case been presented to it for de novo
review. Id. at 68. "It is the province of the [Commission], not appellate courts, to resolve
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same
evidence, it is for the [Commission] to draw the inferences." Id.

Finally, if the Petitioner wished to challenge the factual findings, she had the duty
to properly present the record by marshaling "'all of the evidence supporting the findings
and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory
evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence.'" Viktron/Lika, 38 P.3d
at 995; quoting Grace Drilling Co., 776 P.2d at 68; see also Beaver County v. Utah State
Tax Commission, 916 P.2d 344, 355-56 (Utah 1996); Department of the Air Force v.
Sw|der, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9)(providing that
"[a] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding.").
This issue was preserved in the record at R. 930-938; 950-957.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code § 34A-1-301 provides as follows:
The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction,
and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this
chapter or any other title or chapter it administers.
Utah Code § 34A-l-303(2)(c)(ii) provides as follows:
(ii)

A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the commission
unless set aside by the court of appeals.

Utah Code § 34A-l-303(4) provides as follows:
(a)

On Appeal, the commissioner or the Appeals Board may:
(i)

affirm the decision of an administrative law judge;

(ii)

modify the decision of an administrative law judge;

(iii) return the case to an administrative law judge for further action as
directed; or
(iv)
law judge.

reverse the findings, conclusions, and decision of an administrative

Utah Code § 34A-l-303(4)(c)(i) and (ii) provides as follows:
The commissioner or Appeals Board may base its decision on:
(i)

the evidence previously submitted in the case; or

(ii)
on written argument or written supplemental evidence requested by
the commissioner or Appeals Board.
Utah Code § 63-46b-16(4)(g) provides as follows:
(4)

The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review
has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(g)
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Susan Carter ("Carter") was employed by Henry Schein, Inc. ("Henry Schein") on
March 12, 1997 as a commissioned sales representative. She subsequently became an
employee of Sullivan-Schein Dental Company ("Sullivan-Schein") on November 14,
1997 following a merger between Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental.

Carter was

involuntarily terminated on March 25, 1998 after two co-workers complained on separate
occasions that she had violated a Sullivan-Schein company directive that prohibited a
sales representative from soliciting ("poaching") an account not assigned to them.
On August 11, 1998, Carter filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Labor
Commission of the Utah Anti Discrimination Division alleging that her March 25, 1998
termination violated the Utah Antidiscrimination Act of 1965 ("Act"), Utah Code § 34A5-101, et seq. (R. 1). Specifically, Carter alleged in her Charge that her March 25, 1998
termination was in retaliation for a letter that she had submitted to Sullivan-Schein's
management over three months earlier, claiming for the first time that several years
earlier she had been a victim of alleged gender-based discrimination and inappropriate
sexual comments involving two co-workers at her former employer, Mountain West
Dental. Those former co-workers were now current Sullivan-Schein employees. Id; see
also Hearing Exhibit P-2.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted before an ALJ of the Utah Labor
Commission on March 26, 27, 28 and June 10, 2003. In a decision issued on January 7,
2004, the ALJ was persuaded that Sullivan-Schein had terminated Carter's employment

in retaliation for her December 14, 1997 letter concerning a previous employer. (R. 769795). The ALJ concluded that Sullivan-Schein's action violated the Act's prohibition
against retaliation, and awarded Carter damages of $191,649.72, plus interest. Id,
On March 8, 2004, Sullivan-Schein filed a timely Motion for Review requesting
that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission ("Board") review the ALJ's
decision. (R. 837-893). On May 31, 2005, the Board, in a 2-1 decision, concluded that
Sullivan-Schein had not retaliated against Carter and, therefore, had not violated the Act.
(R. 930-938).

Accordingly, the Board set aside the ALJ's decision and dismissed

Carter's complaint.
On June 20, 2005, Carter filed with the Board a timely Motion to Reconsider the
Board's May 31, 2005 order. (R. 938-948). On August 25, 2005 the Board denied
Carter's Motion to Reconsider, thereby re-affirming its previous decision entered on May
31, 2005. (R. 970-973). On September 13, 2005, Carter filed a timely Petition for
Review, pursuant to Utah Code §§ 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3(2)(a), seeking from this Court
a reversal of the Board's May 31, 2005 and August 25, 2005 decisions. (R. 974-975).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Carter's Employment with Mountain West Dental
Between November 1992 and August 1993, Susan Carter ("Carter"), was

employed by Mountain West Dental as a field sales representative where she was
supervised by Blaine Brown ("Brown") and Parke Simmons ("Simmons"). Carter's 3/26
Hearing Transcript ("HT") @ 71, 173; Appellant's Appendix ("App.") 71, 97. In August
1993, Mountain West Dental terminated Carter's employment. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 71-

72, 79, 173; App. 71, 73, 97. Carter never formally complained about the conditions of
her employment or about her termination from Mountain West Dental.
B.

Sullivan Dental Acquires Mountain West Dental
Three years after Carter was terminated by Mountain West Dental, in September

1996, Sullivan Dental Products, Inc. ("Sullivan Dental"), a large multi-state dental
equipment and supply distributor, acquired Mountain West Dental. Simmons' 3/27 HT
@ 191; Nightingale's 6/10 HT @ 225-26; App. 173, 325. Following Sullivan Dental's
acquisition of Mountain West Dental, Brown and Simmons became employees of
Sullivan Dental. Simmons' 3/27 HT @ 190-191; App. 173.
C.

Carter Goes to Work at Henry Schein, Inc., Which Acquires Sullivan Dental
In March 1997, Carter became employed by Henry Schein, Inc. ("Henry Schein"),

a multi-state direct mail order dental supply company, as a commissioned sales
representative in the Salt Lake City area. Carter's 3/27 HT @ 26; Engel's 3/28 HT @
105; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 116; App. 132, 229, 297. On or about November 12, 1997
Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental announced to the public that the two companies were
merging. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 95-96; App. 226. This merger resulted in two direct
competitors combining their operations and creating a single sales force; respective sales
forces that were accustomed to competing with each other. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98-99,
103; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 216; App. 227-228, 256. This meant that Carter, Brown
and Simmons would once again be working for the same company, as Sullivan-Schein
employees. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 81-83, 86; App. 74-75.

D.

Carter's December 14, 1997 Letter
Carter, apparently concerned about working again with Brown and Simmons, even

though neither individual would have any supervisory control over her at SullivanSchein, drafted and faxed a letter to Henry Schein's management on December 14, 1997.
Carter's 3/26 HT @ 84-86, 169, 175-176; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 267; Hearing Exhibit P2; App. 74-75, 96-97, 190. Carter claimed she drafted the December 14, 1997 letter in
order to protect her job. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 84-85, 169-172; App. 74-75, 96. In her
letter, Carter expressed her concern based upon her experience at Mountain West Dental
that she would be uncomfortable working again in the same office with Brown and
Simmons, and requested a separate office location. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 170; Hearing
Exhibit P-2; App. 96. On or about December 29, 1997 Henry Schein's management
through its Vice President - Human Resources and Special Counsel, Leonard David
("David"), formally responded to Carter's December 14, 1997 letter (Hearing Exhibit R3). David's 6/10 HT @ 163, 171-173; Hearing Exhibit R-3; App. 309, 311-312. Carter
received David's letter. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 177-178; App. 98. David's December 29,
1997 letter invited Carter to contact him if she had any complaints or concerns regarding
any type of harassment or retaliation. David's 6/10 HT @ 173; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 179;
Hearing Exhibit R-3; App. 312, 98. Carter never subsequently contacted David with any
complaints or concerns of any type of harassment or retaliation. David's 6/10 HT @
173-174; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 179-180, App. 312, 98. Also in response to Carter's letter,
Sullivan-Schein executives counseled Brown and Simmons against any inappropriate

conduct, comments, or retaliation against Carter.

David's 6/10 HT @ 172-173;

Simmons' 3/27 HT @ 193-197; App. 311-312, 174-175.
E.

Dynamics of the Merger Between Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental
The merger between Henry Schein and Sullivan Dental was unavoidably a delicate

and fragile business arrangement, given the competitive landscape of merging and
integrating two formerly competitive sales forces into one sales force in the same market,
with the same customer base. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98-105, 114-116, 121, 141-142;
Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 227-229, 231, 233, 238, 300. In many instances,
the sales representatives from the two merged companies had previously been competing
with each other by calling on the same customers. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 102-103, 105;
Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 216; App. 228-229, 256.
In Utah, the merger meant that more sales representatives would have to split the
same amount of sales territory. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 171; App. 96. The merger also
created an overlap of customers between the sales representatives, as many sales
representatives from the merged companies had the assignment of the same sales
accounts, or what were referred to as "crossover accounts." Engel's 3/28 HT @ 118-119;
Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 221-223; App. 232, 258. The term "crossover" simply refers to
the situation when two sales representatives are assigned to the same sales account.
Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 115-116; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 106; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225-226;
App. 297, 229, 110.
The dynamics of the merger created many challenges for the newly merged
company as the merger bred distrust between the former Sullivan Dental and former

Henry Schein sales representatives; sales representatives that once were fierce
competitors with each other. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98-106, 115-116; App. 227-229, 231,
234-235. At the same time, other companies competing with Sullivan-Schein were trying
to steal sales representatives whenever possible and discredit the new company. Engel's
3/28 HT @ 105-106, 141-142; App. 229, 238.
To navigate the changes resulting from the merger and in order to ensure its
success, Sullivan-Schein instituted a policy prohibiting sales representatives from calling
on accounts not assigned to them. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-121; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169;
App. 232-233, 96. This policy was intended to prevent intra-company competition
between sales representatives for the same business, as the success of the merger was, in
part, dependent on a smooth integration of the two merged sales forces. Engel's 3/28 HT
@ 115, 120-121, 141-142; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 231, 232-233, 238,
300.

F.

The Roadshow Directive to Play Like a Team
Shortly after the merger the new merged company conducted several "roadshows"

to introduce the merged sales force to the new company. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 112-115;
App. 230-231. Carter attended the Seattle, Washington roadshow held on January 5,
1998. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 112-115; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 178-179; App. 230-231, 98.
James Stahly ("Stahly"), Sullivan-Schein's President of the North American Dental
Group and James Engel ("Engel"), Sullivan-Schein's zone manager for the western zone,
also attended the January 5, 1998 roadshow and were the roadshow's primary presenters.

Engel's 3/28 HT @ 112-113; App. 231-231. Engle made his presentation dressed in a
referee's uniform. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 115; App. 231.
One of the messages stressed at the Seattle roadshow was that all sales
representatives had to play like a team in order to make the merger a success. Engel's
3/28 HT @ 114-116, 120-121; App. 231-233. This message was designed to squelch any
intra-company competition between sales representatives following the merger as
Sullivan-Schein specifically stressed to all its sales representatives that they should not
call on customers no longer assigned to them. Id. Stahly informed all Seattle roadshow
attendees that the new merged company would have zero tolerance for anyone who
violated this rule. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-122, 167-168; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 125127; App. 232-233, 244, 300. Stahly also informed the roadshow attendees that if they
competed with their own team members by calling on accounts not assigned to them,
such conduct would subject them to termination. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 159-160, 167-168;
Scheutzow's 6/10 @ 125-127; App. 242, 244, 300.
G.

Competition, Crossovers and Assignment of Sales Accounts
The crossover issues created by the merger generated a competitive environment

between sales representatives. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 103-105, 115; Bingham's 3/27 HT @
264; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 226-229; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169-172; App. 228-229, 231,
189, 110-111, 96. This competitive environment was fueled by sales representatives
trying to maintain those sales accounts they had prior to the merger. Engel's 3/28 HT @
115; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 264; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 171-172; App. 231, 189, 96.
Carter understood the rule that Sullivan-Schein sales representatives were prohibited
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from calling on another sales representative's sales account. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169,
172;App.96.
In relationship to the merger, Sullivan-Schein devised a plan to eliminate
crossovers and to balance the territories between sales representatives so that each
particular sales account was assigned to only a single Sullivan-Schein sales
representative. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 106-111, Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 221-223; App.
229-230, 258. When two sales representatives had assignment of the same account, the
sales representative with the highest dollar sales volume was usually assigned that
account. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 222-223; App. 258. However, if a customer expressed
a preference for one sales representative over another sales representative, the preferred
sales representative was assigned the account regardless of sales volume. Scheutzow's
3/28 HT @ 223; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 109-110; App. 258, 230. Eliminating all of the
crossover issues was not necessarily an easy or a quick task. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 101104, 107-111; Bingham's 3/27 HT@ 258; App. 228-230, 188.
In order to prevent sales representatives from either interfering with the process to
eliminate crossovers or from unduly influencing the process, sales representatives were
given two specific instructions to follow until a final list of accounts could be completed.
Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 300. First, sales representatives were instructed
to conduct business as usual by continuing to call on their accounts, including crossover
accounts. Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 36; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 259; App. 277, 188.
Second, to prevent a sales representative from unduly influencing an account's preference
during the process of eliminating crossovers, sales representatives were instructed that

they should not solicit a customer to express a preference in their favor. Scheutzow's
6/10 HT @ 37, 127-128; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 259-262; App. 278, 300, 188-189. This
was known as "soliciting loyalty." Id.
However, after an account was assigned to a specific sales representative,
Sullivan-Schein provided very clear directives to its sales representatives that they should
not call on an account no longer assigned to them.

EngePs 3/28 HT @ 119-122;

Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 223-225; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; App. 232-233, 258-259, 96.
In fact, all sales representatives recognize an unwritten industry taboo against calling on
an account assigned exclusively to another or fellow sales representative. Engel's 3/28
HT @ 121-122; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 261-264; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 223-224; App.
233, 189, 258. Carter, herself, clearly understood this rule. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169;
App. 96. Gary Anderson ("Anderson"), Henry Schein's Director of Human Resources,
described this industry taboo as "poaching." Anderson's 3/28 HT @ 64-65; App. 218219. Anderson defined "poaching" as occurring when a salesperson attempts to usurp an
account that's on somebody else's account list. Anderson's 3/28 HT @ 65; App. 219.
Sullivan-Schein had and has a strong, virtual no-tolerance policy against a salesperson
who attempts to "poach" an account from a fellow sales representative. Anderson's 3/28
HT @ 65; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-122; App. 219, 232-233.
H.

Carter's Repetitive Predatory Behavior Leads to Her Termination
Carter was the subject of three separate complaints from co-workers involving

predatory behavior; one resulting in no discipline, the second in a written warning, and
the third resulting in her termination. None of the co-workers that complained about

Carter's predatory conduct had knowledge of her December 14, 1997 letter. Bingham's
3/27 HT @ 289; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 276-277; App. 196, 122-123. All three complaints
by Carter's co-workers were directed to her direct supervisor, Joseph Scheutzow
("Scheutzow"). Butler's 3/26 HT @ 241-242, 255-257; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 271-272;
Scheutzow's 3/28 @ 227-228, 232-234; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 90; App. 114, 117-118,
191, 259-261. The three complaints against Carter each echoed the same type of
predatory behavior; behavior that Sullivan-Schein had previously warned all sales
representatives, including Carter, to avoid.. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; Engel's 3/28 HT @
115-122; App. 96, 231-233.
The first complaint was lodged by Mike Butler ("Butler"). Specifically, Butler
complained to Scheutzow that Carter had gone into his best customer, Dr. Brooks,
claiming that she, rather then Butler, was the Sullivan-Schein sales representative.
Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225, 241-243; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 232; App. 110, 114, 260. As
a result of Carter's predatory conduct, Butler lost the account. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225,
241-242, 274; App. 110, 114, 122. Although the Dr. Brooks' account may have been on
Carter's "run list" at the time she attempted to solicit the account, making the account a
"crossover" account, the Dr. Brooks' account was one of Butler's best customers.
Carter's attempt to go into that account, claiming that she suddenly was the SullivanSchein sales representative to the exclusion of Butler, was viewed by Butler as not
playing by the rules. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 225-229, 241-242, 274; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT
@ 232-234; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 67; App. 110-111, 114, 122, 260-261. Carter's
aggressive conduct illustrated and foreshadowed her predatory behavior towards her own

sales team members that ultimately resulted in her termination; behavior that her sales
team members greatly resented. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 273-274 (Butler: "I was very angry
because I lost my best account."); Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 282 (Bingham: "I still felt it
was out of bounds..."); App. 122, 194. It was Carter's conduct at the Dr. Brooks'
account that led Butler to formally complain about her later conduct at Heritage Dental.
That complaint ultimately led to Carter's termination. Butler's 3/26 HT @ 273-276;
Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-234; App. 122, 261.
The second complaint against Carter was made by Melanie Bingham
("Bingham"). Bingham complained to Scheutzow that Carter had tried to solicit the Dr.
Clegg account; an account that was specifically and without dispute assigned to
Bingham. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 180-181; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 270-273; App. 98-99,
191-192. Carter knew the Dr. Clegg account was assigned exclusively to Bingham,
although the Dr. Clegg account had been previously assigned to Carter as a Henry Schein
representative. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 121-122, 180-184; App. 84, 98-99. Carter further
understood that once the Dr. Clegg account was assigned to Bingham she (Carter) was no
longer to engage in any activities to solicit that account. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 180-181,
184; App. 98-99.
After the Dr. Clegg account had been removed from Carter's accounts list and
assigned exclusively to Bingham, Carter spoke with Dr. Clegg and a staff member
regarding the manner in which Dr. Clegg's orders should be placed in order to obtain the
lowest possible price. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 180-181, 184-189; App. 98-101. Carter
explained to Dr. Clegg that Bingham was applying the wrong pricing plan to his account,

is

as Bingham needed to input his orders through the Schein computer system rather than
through the Sullivan computer system; a tactic that clearly undermined Bingham's
credibility with her own customer. Carter's 3/26 HT @ 185-189; Hearing Exhibit R-4;
App. 100-101. Bingham considered Carter's conduct "out of bounds," especially in light
of the tensions between sales representatives caused by the merger and the rules that team
members were given to follow. Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 263-266, 273-274, 281-282; App.
189-190,192,194.
In response to Bingham's complaint, Engel sent a letter to Carter, dated February
18, 1998, warning her of possible termination for any future episodes of attempting to
secure customers assigned to other Sullivan-Schein sales representatives. Engel's 3/28
HT @ 135-142; Hearing Exhibit R-4; Carter's 3/26 HT @ 189; App. 236-238, 101.
Engel decided to discipline Carter and issue her the February 18, 1998 letter only after
Bingham vehemently complained about Carter's predatory contact with her client, Dr.
Clegg. Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 271-275; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 227-230; Hearing
Exhibit R-4; App. 191-192, 259-260. Engel also issued Carter the warning letter out of
his concern that Carter's conduct threatened and undermined the success of the merger,
as her conduct clearly violated the "play like a team" concept that Engel had previously
communicated to all sales representatives at the roadshows. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 114-116
(Engel: "...if we allowed anyone - to buck the system, so-to-speak, you know, the
referees would be called in to throw a flag."), 141-142; Hearing Exhibit R-4; App. 231,
238.

The third complaint, like the first, also was made by Butler. Heritage Dental, at
the request of the customer, had been re-assigned by Scheutzow to Butler. Butler's 3/26
HT @ 249-257; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-236; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 134; App.
116-118, 261, 302. After Butler was assigned the Heritage Dental account, he was
informed by the customer that Carter had continued to come into the office and that if she
came back, Heritage Dental's owner would call the police on her. Butler's 3/26 HT @
255-257; 272-274, Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-236; App. 117-118, 121-122, 261.
Butler immediately reported Carter's intrusions into Heritage Dental to Scheutzow:
"She's doing it again... She's calling on one of my accounts." Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @
233-234; App. 261. Scheutzow clearly understood Butler's reference that "She's doing it
again" as a reference to Butler's previous complaint about Carter's solicitation of Dr.
Brooks, one of Butler's best customers. Id.
I.

Carter's Termination
It was Butler's complaint about Carter's intrusions into the Heritage Dental

account that directly led to her termination. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 233-242; App. 261263. Just prior to Butler's complaint about Carter's intrusion into the Heritage Dental
account, Sullivan-Schein's management had decided to terminate two sales positions in
Utah as part of a territory realignment necessitated by the merger. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT
@ 246-252; App. 264-265. This territory realignment resulted in the termination of
Michael Blickfeldt and Kent Evans; all other Utah sales representatives, including Carter,
were considered to be final team members. Engle's 3/28 HT @ 131-132; Scheutzow's
3/28 HT @ 246-252; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 129; Hearing Exhibits R-33, R-34, R-36;

App. 235, 264-265, 301. After learning of the final list of sales representatives following
the realignment, Stahly specifically mentioned to Engel that he was pleased Carter would
be part of the team. EngePs 3/28 HT @ 131-132; App. 235. There was no predisposition
against Carter among management.
Scheutzow, after confirming Butler's complaint about Carter going into Heritage
Dental, contacted Engel. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 236; App. 261. Scheutzow informed
Engel that Carter had gone into one of Butler's accounts again, and the account owner
had threatened to call the police if Carter came back. Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 236;
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 143; App. 261, 238. After receiving the information regarding
Butler's complaint, Engel contacted Stahly for advice as to what action should be taken
against Carter. Engel's 3/28 HT @ 143; App. 238. Stahly, based upon the information
that Carter again had encroached on another sales representative's account, and based
upon the previous February 18, 1998 warning letter (Hearing Exhibit R-4/P-8) issued to
Carter, gave Engel the instruction to terminate Carter's employment immediately.
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 143-144; App. 238.
Carter's poaching was tolerated once, but not twice.

On March 25, 1998,

Scheutzow informed Carter that she was being terminated from her employment
specifically for calling on the Heritage Dental account that had been assigned to Butler,
thus violating the February 18, 1998 directive from Engel that warned Carter to not
solicit the loyalty of customers assigned to other sales representatives. Scheutzow's 3/28
HT @ 237-243; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 128-129, 134; Hearing Exhibit R-14; App. 262263, 300-302.

Carter was disciplined and then terminated for poaching; not for

"crossover" issues. Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 121, 128-129; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @
234-236; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 201; App. 299-301, 253, 261. Carter was the only SullivanSchein sales representative who violated this rule regarding calling on an account not
assigned to her after having been previously warned not to engage in such conduct.
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 142-143, 201-202; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 230-231; App. 238, 253,
260.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the Board because Carter failed to marshal the evidence
supporting the Board's decision. In her opening brief Carter ignored evidence supporting
the Board's findings and instead selectively marshaled only the isolated pieces of
evidence that support her case. Simply, Carter failed to marshal the evidence to show
that the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Even if Carter had
met her burden in marshaling the evidence, she nevertheless failed to demonstrate any
fatal flaw in the evidence, the gravity of which would be sufficient to convince this Court
that the Board's findings are clearly erroneous. Without Carter demonstrating a fatal
flaw in the evidence, this Court should not overturn the Board's findings even if another
conclusion from the evidence is possible.
The Board was well within its statutory authority when it reversed the findings and
conclusions of the ALJ and adopted its own. Moreover, the Board made sufficient
factual findings to demonstrate a logical and legal basis for its determination that the
evidence did not warrant an inference of a causal connection between Carter's December
14, 1997 letter and her March 25, 1998 termination. This Court should affirm also

because the Board acted within its statutory discretion, and because its decision is
supported by substantial evidence. The Utah legislature granted the Board express
statutory authority to accept, modify, or reverse the ALJ's findings and adopt its own.
See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(4)(a)(iv).
Finally, this Court should affirm the Board because it carefully and correctly
applied the correct legal standard in making its finding that there was no causal
connection between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her March 25, 1998
termination. The Board properly relied upon Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d
999 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) as setting forth the elements of a prima facie case of unlawful
retaliation. Carter did not show, and cannot show that the Board's findings are so lacking
in support as to make them clearly erroneous. Substantial evidence strongly supports the
Board's findings, and even if this Court were to believe that another conclusion from the
evidence is possible, this Court is obligated to affirm the Board's decision. The Board
correctly found that Sullivan-Schein terminated Carter because of her co-workers'
complaints, and not in retaliation for her letter alleging years old discrimination at a
different employer. (R. 934,971).
ARGUMENT
L

CARTER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
This Court should affirm the Board for the reason that Carter wholly failed to

marshal the evidence. In challenging the Board's factual findings, Carter was obligated
to proceed in two steps. First, she had to marshal all the evidence supporting the Board's
findings. Second, she was required to demonstrate that despite the supporting facts, and

in light of any conflicting or contradictory evidence, the Board's findings are not
supported by substantial evidence. See Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993,
995 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). She did neither. This Court has consistently affirmed an
agency's factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. See
Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Substantial
evidence is "'that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 882 P.2d 141, 146 (Utah 1994) quoting Boston First National Bank
v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). Substantial
evidence supports the Board's decision.
The marshaling process required Carter to "present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced... which supports the very
findings that the appellant resists." West Vallev City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). (emphasis original). "Once the appellants have
established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then 'must ferret out a
fatal flaw in the evidence' and show why those pillars fail to support the [agency's]
findings." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, 872 P.2d 1052, 1053
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) quoting West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. Consequently, an
appellant fails to meet her burden of marshaling when she ignores evidence supportive of
the agency's findings and instead selectively marshals only that evidence which is
supportive of her position. See Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith
Assoc, 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Such a tactic is tantamount to rearguing

the merits of her case; a tactic this Court has consistently rejected. See Campbell v. Box
Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)("When a party fails to marshal the
evidence supporting a challenged fact finding, we reject the challenge as 'nothing more
than an attempt to reargue the case before [the appellate] court.'" quoting Promax
Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Oneida/SLIC
872 P.2d at 1053; Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah Ct. App.
1993); see also Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178
(Utah 1993)("[W]hen reviewing an agency's decision, [we do] not ... reweigh the
evidence.").
Although Carter inserted within her brief a section entitled "Marshalling of the
Evidence" and sprinkled selective facts within her arguments, she wholly failed to
marshal all the evidence supporting the Board's decision. Rather, she attacked portions
of the Board's findings that she disagrees with, and ignored evidence supporting those
findings. Consequently, Carter has done nothing more than reargue her case before this
Court by focusing her arguments on the Board's interpretation of the evidence and on
those selective facts that she believes support her case. Because Carter failed to satisfy
her threshold duty on appeal to properly marshal the evidence, this Court should affirm
and uphold the Board's findings of fact. See Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516
(Utah Ct. App. 1996)(Absent a marshaling of evidence, "[w]e will uphold [an agency's]
findings of fact.").
Finally, even assuming Carter properly marshaled all the evidence before this
Court, she had another obligation, to demonstrate a fatal flaw in the evidence, the gravity

of which was sufficient to convince the appellate court that the Board's findings are
clearly erroneous. See West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315 ("After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence."). Simply, Carter failed to elicit a fatal flaw in the Board's decision that
requires reversal. It is not enough for Carter to have merely shown conflicting evidence,
or that inconsistent inferences could be drawn from the same evidence, in order for this
Court to overturn the Board's findings. See Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)("It is the province of the [Board], not appellate courts,
to resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the
same evidence, it is for the [Board] to draw the inferences."). Because Carter failed to
demonstrate a fatal flaw in the Board's decision, this Court should affirm the Board.
II.

THE BOARD WAS WITHIN ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN
MAKING ITS OWN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CREDIBILITY
DETERMINATIONS.
A.

The Board's Statutory Authority and This Court's Role on Review Are
Clear.

This Court should reject Carter's claims that the Board exceeded its statutory
authority. The Utah Code expressly grants the Board the authority to accept, modify, or
reverse the ALJ's findings and adopt its own.

See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-

303(4)(a)(iv). There is nothing in the Utah Code that limits the power of the Board itself
in reviewing and adopting or reversing the findings of the ALJ, nor mandates or indicates
that the Board is bound by the findings of the ALJ when the evidence is conflicting. See
United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 607 P.2d 807, 810 (Utah 1980); see

also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(4)(a)(i)-(iv). In addition, only the action of the Board
is subject to review here, and not the decision of the ALJ. This Court has jurisdiction
only over "final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of
state agencies...". See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a); see also Utah Code Ann. § 34Al-303(2)(c)(ii)("A decision of the Appeals Board is a final order of the Commission
unless set aside by the court of appeals.").
The Utah Supreme Court long ago declared that the Board may, "in its review of
the record made before the Administrative Law Judge,...make its own findings on the
credibility of the evidence presented." United States Steel Corp., 607 P.2d at 811; see
also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-l-303(4)(a)(ii) and (iv). Subsequently, the Utah appellate
courts have consistently followed the rule that an ALJ's findings are not binding in later
agency review proceedings. See e.g., Giles v. Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d 743, 745
(Utah 1984); Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1994);
Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 888 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah Ct App. 1994);
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); USX Corp. v.
Industrial Commission, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
B.

Carter's Reliance on Vali is Misplaced.

Carter relies on Vali Convalescent and Care Inst, v. Div. of Health Care
Financing, 797 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) to argue that the Board must detail the
reasons for reaching a different result from that of the ALJ. See Petitioner's Brief at p.
41; citing Vali, 797 P.2d at 447. Carter argues that the Board committed reversible error
when it rejected the ALJ's credibility assessment of certain witnesses without stating in

detail the reasons for doing so. See Petitioner's Brief at p. 41. This Court has
consistently rejected this argument in previous cases, and should do so here. See
Commercial Carriers, 888 P.2d at 710 ("[Petitioner] argues that the Board cannot reverse
the ALJ's findings of fact without stating specifically and in detail the reasons for doing
so. We disagree.").
Carter misapplies and misinterprets this Court's ruling in Vali. There is no
specific requirement under Utah law that a reviewing agency rejecting an ALJ's findings
of fact and conclusions of law has to provide some kind of specific, point-by-point
reasons as to why it disagrees with the ALJ. See Petitioner's Brief at p. 40. Such a
requirement would place the reviewing agency in the role of an advocate confronted
against its own ALJ. All that is required under Utah law is that the reviewing agency,
when rejecting an ALJ's findings and adopting its own, provide subsidiary findings in
sufficient detail so as to demonstrate that there is a logical and legal basis for its ultimate
conclusions. See Vali, 797 P.2d at 450; see also Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373,1378 (Utah 1986). That requirement is met here.
1.

Vali concerned unarticulated credibility assessments.

The decision in Vali addressed the issue of whether one party had settled and
compromised its claim to interest when it accepted a settlement of a disputed claim.
After a formal hearing, the hearing officer adopted the parties' stipulated facts and
concluded that the matter of interest had not been settled or compromised. Vali, 797 P.2d
at 442. The executive director of the Utah Department of Health, upon reviewing the
record and the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer, purported to sustain the

hearing's officer's findings of fact but overruled his conclusions of law; finding that the
parties had an enforceable executory contract of settlement which included the claim for
interest. Vail 797 P.2d at 442. On review, this Court found that because the hearing
officer's findings were apparently based on his credibility determinations of the
witnesses, the executive director's reversal of the hearing officer's findings were
troubling since the executive director had not explained the basis for her ultimate factual
conclusions. See Vail 797 P.2d at 447, 450. That is, this Court found that it could not
sustain the executive director's reversal of the hearing officer's decision without the
executive director having made additional written findings other than those of ultimate
fact; requiring the executive director to articulate such adequate factual findings as to
demonstrate that there was a logical and legal basis for her ultimate decision. Vail 797
P.2d at 448-49 citing Milne Truck Lines, Inc., 720 P.2d at 1378. Based upon this Court's
holding that the executive director failed to provide sufficiently detailed findings to
disclose the steps by which she reached her ultimate factual conclusions, the Vali Court
remanded the matter back to the executive director (through the district court) for an
opportunity for the executive director "to make more adequate findings in support of, and
folly articulate her reasons for, the determination she made." Vali, 797 P.2d at 450.
2.

The Board's decision here contains detailed findings.

Unlike Vali, the Board in this matter made ample factual findings supporting its
decision. (R. 934-935, 970-971). Consistent with the directive in Vali, the Board
provided factual findings to support its determination that there was no causal connection
between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her March 25, 1998 termination. The

Board, through five (5) separate paragraphs, articulated sufficient detailed facts as to why
it determined that there could be no reasonable inference to support a finding that a
causal connection existed between protected activity and the adverse employment action.
(R. 934-935). Specifically, the Board made subsidiary factual findings in such detail as
to demonstrate a logical and legal basis for its determinations. Id. Given the detail of the
Board's factual findings, there is no question that the Board examined all of the evidence
presented to the ALJ, as well as the ALJ's findings and conclusions, before arriving at
newfindingsof its own.
Thus, absent evidence that the new findings are not supported by substantial
evidence, this Court should affirm the findings and conclusions of the Board. See United
States Steel Corp., 607 P.2d at 810 ("... this Court cannot overturn the findings of fact
made by the Commission if there is substantial evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for
such findings, there is nothing in our statutes which limits the power of the Commission
itself in reviewing and adopting or reversing the findings of its [ALJ].").
III.

THE BOARD'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
A.

The Board Correctly Applied the Proper Legal Analysis in
Determining Carter's Retaliation Claim.

The Board carefully and correctly applied the proper legal standard to the record,
finding that there was no causal connection between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter
and her subsequent termination. Carter attacked the Board's correct finding of no causal
connection by asserting that by considering two items of evidence, the Board
misunderstood and misapplied the elements of a retaliation claim under the Utah Anti-

Discrimination Act ("Act"). First, Carter asserts that the Board committed error by
considering Sullivan-Schein's prompt and appropriate response to Carter's December 14,
1997 letter. See Appellant's Brief at p. 35. Second, Carter asserts that the Board
committed error by considering the fact that Carter's letter dealt with years old events
involving an entirely different employer. Id. at p. 37. Contrary to Carter's claims,
considering these factors was entirely proper, and the Board correctly applied the record
herein to the elements of a retaliation claim under the Act.
The Board correctly cited Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993 (Utah
Ct. App. 2001) as setting forth the elements ofa prima facie case of unlawful retaliation.
(R. 933-934, 971). The Board properly identified the elements of a prima facie case of
unlawful retaliation as consisting of: (1) protected opposition to discrimination; (2)
adverse action by the employer subsequent to the protected activity; and (3) a causal
connection between the employee's activity and the adverse action.

(R. 933-934).

Properly identifying the elements of a prima facie case for retaliation, the Board then
correctly applied the evidence and found no inference of a causal connection between's
Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her termination over three months later. (R. 933935).
1.

Sullivan-Schein's Prompt Response was Properly Considered.

In analyzing the third prong of the prima facie case, that is, whether there is a
causal connection between the alleged protected activity and the adverse action, the
Board properly considered the undisputed evidence that Sullivan-Schein, in order to
prevent any future problems, took prompt and appropriate action in response to Carter's

letter. (R. 934). Carter provided no legal authority suggesting that the Board erred in
considering this evidence, or that the evidence was not relevant in evaluating whether
there was a causal connection between the letter and the termination. Carter's only
argument was that the Board conflated the elements of a retaliation claim and the
elements of a discriminatory harassment claim. See Appellant's Brief at p. 36. This is
incorrect.
Contrary to Carter's self-serving assertion, the Board did not interject elements of
a harassment claim into its analysis. As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), evidence of an
employer's prompt and effective response is an affirmative defense that is available to an
employer defending against a harassment claim. In this case, however, there is no
indication that the Board applied any element of a harassment claim to Carter's claim for
retaliation. Nor is there any indication that the Board applied evidence of SullivanSchein's prompt response as an affirmative defense to somehow automatically defeat
Carter's claim. Rather, the Board was clear in its decision that it did not consider
Sullivan-Schein's prompt response as an absolute defense to Carter's claim of retaliation.
Rather, the Board considered it only as one of several pieces of evidence that, in the
Board's opinion, and when considered together with other evidence, negated an inference
of a causal connection between Carter's letter and her subsequent termination. (R. 934,
971).

2.

The Board Properly Noted That Carter's Letter Dealt With Years
Old Events at a Different Employer.

In applying the third element ofa prima facie case, contrary to Carter's assertions,
the Board did not impose a requirement that the underlying complaint involve
contemporaneous events at the current employer, nor did the Board eviscerate the first
element of the prima facie case by its finding. See Appellant's Brief at p. 37. The Board
simply found that because Carter's letter dealt with events that occurred several years
earlier at another employer, such a fact was inconsistent with the proposition that her
letter was a motivating factor for her current employer's termination of her employment
months after the letter was written. (R. 934). This finding was permissible, and correct.
Carter's argument that the Board's finding modifies the first element of & prima
facie case for retaliation is incorrect and misleading. If such were true, then the third
element of causation would be superfluous and would be subsumed by the first element.
That is, Carter is not entitled to a finding of a causal connection simply because she
engaged in protected activity, nor was the Board incorrect in its finding of no causal
connection even though it found that Carter had engaged in protected activity. The
relevant inquiry always remains whether the protected activity motivated the subsequent
adverse action. The Board did not stray from this focus in rendering its decision. The
Board simply applied common sense to its decision and found that evidence regarding the
context of Carter's letter, coupled with other facts in the record, negated against a finding
that Carter's letter was a motivating factor in her termination. (R. 971).

3.

The Board's Factual Determination Regarding Causation Was Based
Upon Multiple Pieces of Evidence.

Carter criticized the Board's decision by attacking individual pieces of the Board's
findings, without acknowledging that the Board based its decision on a cumulative
collection of evidence establishing that Sullivan-Schein disciplined and then terminated
Carter because her co-workers complained about her predatory behavior. (R. 934). That
is, the Board did not rule that because Sullivan-Schein took prompt and appropriate
action in response to Carter's letter that such a fact by itself defeated Carter's retaliation
claim. Nor did the Board decide that just because Carter's letter dealt with events
occurring several years earlier at a different employer that such a fact by itself resulted in
a finding of no retaliation. Rather, in deciding the issue of causation, the Board simply
found that Sullivan-Schein's prompt response to Carter's letter, coupled with evidence
regarding the context of her letter, considered together with other evidence of her coworkers' repeated complaints about her predatory behavior, provided the Board a rational
basis to conclude that Sullivan-Schein did not have a retaliatory motive in its decision to
terminate her employment. (R. 934, 971). At a minimum, Carter failed in her proof, and
thus this Court should affirm the Board's conclusion.

B.

The Board Based its Decision Upon the Evidence Previously Submitted
in the Case in Accordance with Utah Code § 34A-l-303(4)(c).

In her attempt to set aside the Board's decision, Carter unjustifiably argued that
the Board exceeded its authority in considering "arguments" that were not previously
raised in the case. See Appellant's Brief at pp. 32-34. Carter created this argument based

upon a false premise that certain of the Board's findings of fact constitute '"argument."
Carter's self-created characterization of the Board's decision is not only incorrect, but it
conveniently provides Carter with an excuse to shirk her responsibility to marshal the
evidence supporting the Board's findings. Carter's attempt to label "findings of fact" as
"argument" also allows her to incorrectly imply that the Board's decision was not based
on the evidence previously submitted. In reality, the Board's findings are clearly based
upon the evidence presented in this case* See Appellant's Brief at p. 30 ("None of these
arguments had previously been raised in the case, and there is no evidence in the record
to support them."). This Court should reject these contortions of the evidence.
1.

The Board's Finding of No Causal Connection was not "Argument."

In reaching its decision, the Board made a factual determination that there was no
causal connection between Carter's December 14, 1997 letter and her subsequent
discipline and termination. (R. 934). This determination is a factual determination. See
Viktron/Lika, 38 P.3d at 995. The Board based its determination upon certain findings of
fact which included a finding, among others, that Sullivan-Schein's "prompt and
appropriate action to prevent any future problems" was a fact inconsistent with the
proposition that Carter's letter was a motivating factor for Sullivan's subsequent action
against her. (R. 934). Carter may disagree with the conclusions, but this is clearly a
"finding of fact" made by the Board, and not an "argument." The Board emphasized in
its decision that "Sullivan-Schein's response is but one fact out of many that sheds light
on the ultimate question of Sullivan-Schein's motivation for its subsequent discharge of
Ms. Carter." (R. 971). Moreover, Sullivan-Schein's prompt and appropriate response to

Carter's letter is sufficiently set forth in the record and is adequate as one piece of
evidence, when considered with other evidence, to support the Board's determination that
no causal connection existed between Carter's letter and her termination months later.
See Hearing Exhibits P-2, R-3; David's 6/10 HT @ 171-173; App. 311-312.
2.

The Board Didn't "Argue" its Factual Conclusion That the
Investigation Into Carter's Complaint was not a Sham.

Carter also deceptively labels as an "argument" the Board's finding that four
specific factors were attributed to Sullivan-Schein's failure to investigate even more
thoroughly the details of the complaints against Carter. See Appellant's Brief at pp. 32,
34. Although the Board found it was possible to fault Sullivan-Schein for failing to
investigate more thoroughly the allegations against Carter, it also found substantial
evidence in the record to support its finding that any deficiency in Sullivan-Schein's
investigation was attributable to legitimate business reasons connected with and related to
the complexity of the merger. (R. 934-935, 970-971). That is, the Board found that
Sullivan-Schein's failure to more thoroughly investigate the complaints against Carter
was not attributable to her December 14, 1997 letter, but rather was attributable to the
cumulative and chaotic circumstances surrounding the merger and to the repetitive nature
of Carter's predatory conduct against her fellow sales representatives. (R. 934-935). The
four factors that the Board found attributable to Sullivan-Schein's reasons for
investigating the complaints against Carter as forcefully as she would have preferred all
have sufficient and substantial support in the record. (R. 935).

(a)

Wide-ranging responsibilities of Sullivan-Schein's managers.

The Board found it significant that the two individuals responsible for disciplining
and then terminating Carter's employment, Joseph Scheutzow and James Engel, had
expansive responsibilities related to the management of Sullivan-Schein's sales force.
Joseph Scheutzow, Sullivan-Schein's then regional manager for the Pacific Northwest
region and Carter's direct supervisor, maintained his office in Seattle, Washington and
was responsible for Sullivan-Schein's sales staff in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Utah and
parts of western Montana. (Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 214; App. 256). James Engel,
Sullivan-Schein's then zone manager for the western zone, was responsible for all sales
operations within approximately 15 western states, supervised four regional managers,
and supervised approximately 240 employees. (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 96; App. 226).
(b)

Disorganization and confusion engendered by the merger.

Joining two previously competing sales forces together was a delicate and fragile
business arrangement, given the competitive landscape of merging and integrating once
two competitive sales forces into the same market with the same customer base. (Engel's
3/28 HT @ 96-108, 114-116, 121-124, 128-129, 141-143; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127128; App. 226-229, 231, 233-235, 238, 300).

The merger created an overlap of

customers between sales representatives, as many sales representatives from the merged
companies had the assignment of the same sales accounts, or what were referred to as
"crossover accounts." (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 118-119; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 220-223;
App. 232, 257-258).

(c)

The Company's paramount concern for the continuity of its
newly combined sales force.

One of the most critical keys to the success of the merger was that the newly
combined sales forces "play like a team." (EngePs 3/28 HT @ 114-121; Scheutzow's
3/28 HT @ 220-221; App. 231-233, 257-258). This was a message that was made clear
to everyone by James Stahly and James Engel at the Seattle, Washington roadshow held
for Sullivan-Schein sales representatives to explain the details of the merger; the same
"road show" attended by Carter. (Carter's 3/26 HT @ 178-179; EngePs 3/28 HT @ 112121; App. 98, 230-233). Sullivan-Schein stressed to all "road show" attendees that the
newly merged company would have a "zero tolerance" for anyone who continued to call
on customers that were no longer assigned to them. (Scheutzow's 3/27 HT @ 183;
Engel's 3/28 HT @ 120-121; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 126-128; App. 171, 232-233,
300). It was further stressed to the "road show" attendees that if any sales representative
competed with their own team members by calling on accounts no longer assigned to
them, such conduct would subject them to termination. (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 114-116,
119-121, 159-160, 167-168; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 126-128; App. 231-233, 242, 244,
300). The success of the merger was dependent, in part, on a smooth integration of the
two merged sales forces and for the sales representatives to follow the critical company
directive of not calling on accounts no longer assigned to them. (Engel's 3/28 HT @ 98121, 128-129, 141-142; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 127-128; App. 227-233, 234-235, 238,
300). Carter knowingly violated this game plan.

(d)

The repetitive nature of the complaints about Carter's
conduct.

The Board found significant that any failure of Sullivan-Schein to more
thoroughly investigate the details of the complaints was, in part, attributable to the
repetitive nature of the complaints made against Carter about her predatory conduct. (R.
935). The evidence in this case showed Carter's clear and undeniable pattern making
attempts to undermine the sales relationships and credibility of her fellow sales
representative by engaging in intra-company competitive conduct; conduct purposefully
engaged in to protect her sales territory. (Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169-172; App. 96). The
substantial evidence in the record supports this finding.
The record shows that Carter was the subject of three separate complaints from
co-workers involving similar predatory behavior; one involving no discipline, the second
involving a written warning, and the third resulting in her termination. (R. 932). The
three complaints against Carter all echoed the same type of predatory behavior; behavior
that Sullivan-Schein had previously warned all sales representatives, including Carter, to
avoid. (Carter's 3/26 HT @ 169; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 113-122; App. 96, 231-233).
The substantial evidence makes it clear that on the third occasion, when Butler
reported Carter's intrusion into the Heritage Dental account, Carter had already
established a pattern of repetitive predatory conduct by soliciting the accounts of Dr.
Brooks, Dr. Clegg and Heritage Dental; conduct that her fellow sales representatives
greatly resented. Consequently, Scheutzow knew, at the time that Butler complained to

him about Carter's intrusion into the Heritage Dental account, that Carter had
accumulated a total of three complaints against her regarding conduct that her fellow
sales representatives considered unfair. ("She's doing it again." Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @
233-234; Scheutzow's 6/10 HT @ 130-131; App. 261, 301). Termination was easily
anticipated from, and clearly resultedfromthis.

3.

The Board's Findings Are Based upon Sullivan-Schein's Good-Faith
Belief that Carter Violated Established Rules of Conduct.

The Board was crystal clear in stating its conclusion that management honestly
believed that Carter had violated established rules of conduct when it took action against
her. (R. 934). This finding is supported by the evidence that Sullivan-Schein did not
take any disciplinary action against Carter until after two co-workers, Bingham and
Butler, complained about Carter's predatory conduct. There is no evidence that either
Bingham or Butler lied or exaggerated about Carter's unfair conduct, nor is there any
evidence that either Engel or Scheutzow disbelieved the complaints of either Bingham or
Butler. Consequently, the Board found that the disciplinary actions taken against Carter
were all prompted by co-workers' similar complaints involving the same type of
predatory behavior; co-workers who knew nothing about Carter's December 14, 1997
letter. (R. 934, 971). The record is clear that Sullivan-Schein's decision to discipline,
and then to subsequently terminate Carter's employment was based directly upon
Carter's own co-workers' complaints about her predatory conduct. (Carter's 3/26 HT @
189; Butler's 3/26 HT @ 241-242, 257, 273-276; Bingham's 3/27 HT @ 270-275, 280,

282; Engel's 3/28 HT @ 136-143; Scheutzow's 3/28 HT @ 232-240; App. 101, 114, 118,
122, 191-194, 236-238, 260-262). Based upon this evidence, it was rational for the
Board to find that there was no causal connection between Carter's December 14, 1997
letter and her March 25, 2998 termination. Thus, this Court should affirm.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject Carter's invitation to reweigh

the evidence in this case so that a decision can be made in her favor. Utah's statutes and
the jurisprudence of this Court preclude such an exercise by this Court, because it is wellestablished that even where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same
evidence, it is for the Board to draw those inferences rather than the appellate court. See
Grace Drilling Co., 776 at 68. Carter has neither marshaled the evidence in this case nor
demonstrated a fatal flaw in the evidence that would require this Court to reverse.
Accordingly, because the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this
Court should affirm the Board's decision.
Dated this 22nd day of March, 2006.
Snell&WilmerL.L.P/

Mark O. Moms
Attorney for Appellee
Sullivan-Schein Dental Company

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and accurate copies of the
nd

foregoing, postage prepaid, via First Class U.S. Mail on the 22no day of March, 2006

Kenneth B. Grimes
4885 South 900 East Suite 211
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

No addendum is necessary.

39061.0001\Monism\SLC\386664

Alan L. Hennebold
160 East 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

